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1. Overview 
 
The present study examined a selection of 76 ransomware splash screens 
collected from a variety of sources. These splash screens were analysed 
according to surface information, including aspects of visual appearance, the 
use of language, cultural icons, payment and payment types. The results from 
the current study showed that, whilst there was a wide variation in the 
construction of ransomware splash screens, there was a good degree of 
commonality, particularly in terms of the structure and use of key aspects of 
social engineering used to elicit payment from the victims. There was the 
emergence of a sub-set of ransomware that, in the context of this report, was 
termed ‘Cuckoo’ ransomware. This type of attack often purported to be from an 
official source requesting payment for alleged transgressions. 
 
2. Introduction  
 
In the last few months several high-profile global cyber attacks have brought 
about an increased awareness of the scourge of ransomware on businesses 
and individuals (for example see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
39920141). Ransomware has been previously defined as: 
 
“a piece of pernicious software that exploits a user’s computer 
vulnerabilities to sneak into the victim’s computer and encrypt all 
his/her files; then the attacker keeps the files locked unless the 
victim agrees to pay a ransom” (Liao, 2008; p. 361).  
 
A great deal of research has been conducted on the underlying technical 
mechanisms associated with ransomware (see Liao, 2008; Luo & Liao, 2007). 
However, detailed explorations examining the content of the initial ransomware 
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splash screens and the underlying psychological techniques employed by the 
attackers to obtain payment have been severely lacking. 
 
In this present study, the concept of a ‘splash screen’ is operationalised as the 
initial warning screen that alerts the victim to the attack, and is seen as the 
online equivalent to the ransom note (see images 1-8 in this report). A detailed 
exploration of these ransomware splash screens offers a variety of potential 
benefits, not least the capacity to stimulate further research in this area. A better 
understanding of the psychological techniques used by attackers in these 
splash screens could provide individuals with critical information to be used as 
part of their decision-making process. This could also include relevant 
signposting towards further help from cybersecurity professionals and law 
enforcement, an action that attackers are keen to dissuade victims from doing. 
From the research perspective, such an exploration could highlight potential 
categories for ransomware splash screens aligned to their use of particular 
tactics and associated levels of sophistication. This may provide a useful 
framework for security professionals and law enforcement officers alike, and 
allow for a more consistent discussion between groups when tackling such 
cybercrimes. 
 
2.1 Is “Psychology” contained within Ransomware Splash Screens? 
In principle, without interviewing the designers of ransomware attacks, we 
cannot say for definite if they have consciously incorporated key psychological 
principles to enhance their chances of being paid. However, irrespective of this 
conscious design and knowledge of the attacker, the impact on the victim 
remains the same. In the context of the current research key tenets taken from 
aspects of social engineering will be used to frame critical psychological 
components included in the ransomware attack. These aspects can be mapped 
jointly onto multiple facets of ransomware splash screens, including both the 
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The concept of social engineering is viewed as the use of manipulation, 
persuasion, and influence by an attacker to obtain sensitive information 
(Uebelacker & Quiel, 2014). In the current discussion, the use of social 
engineering techniques is also seen as a mechanism to leverage payment from 
victims. Hadnagy (2010) provides an excellent overview of the key mechanisms 
used in social engineering, but in the context of the present study the focus will 
be on three key principles detailed below. 
 
● Scarcity: in this instance people find objects or opportunities more 
attractive if they are rare, scarce or hard to obtain. Scarcity is often 
matched with the use of urgency, usually linked to a time-critical offer 
which means people are quick to react and will make fundamental errors 
in decision-making. 
● Authority: individuals are more willing to respond to requests, or follow 
directions, from someone they view as being in authority. This is usually 
irrespective of whether the individual in question actually holds authority 
– if we believe they do, we will follow their instructions. An example of 
this is legal authority, a principle that is based on the individual being a 
member of law enforcement or a government body. 
● Liking: this is a straightforward concept and details the fact that if you 
get someone to like you, they will likely comply with your requests. 
Examples of this in this study include the use of humour as well as a 
conversational tone in the ransomware splash screens.  
2.2 Aims and Objectives 
The present study aims to provide the first attempt at exploring the content of 
ransomware splash screens. Inferences about the underlying psychological 
principles that might be used to elicit payment from victims will be made. The 
sample of ransomware splash screens will also be explored for their shared 
features as well as individual nuances. It is hoped that this initial exploration will 
highlight critical elements contained in ransomware splash screens that could 
be used to help victims make better, more informed decisions. Similarly it is 
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suggested that this report will provide security professionals, law enforcement 
officials and academic researchers a basis for further research in this area.   
 
3. Methodology 
In the context of the current report, the main focus was the content of the initial 
splash screens that provided the victim with information about the attack. To 
limit the scope and breadth of the current report, no further additional files were 
examined linked into the splash screen. The exploration of the splash screens 
focused on the content including but not limited to: 
● Visual and aesthetic 
● Use of language and overt use of social engineering techniques 
● Use of imagery or cultural icons  
● Information related to payment type and content 
 
The sample used in the present study consisted of 76 ransomware splash 
screens which were collected by the research team at SentinelOne, a leading 
endpoint security company based in the U.S., between April 1 – June 30, 2017. 
The sample included splash screens from a variety of sources including: 
● Testing using collected live malware samples 
● ‘ID Ransomware’ website1 
● ‘Bleeping Computer’ forum2 
● ‘Windows Club’3 
● VirusTotal4 
● Malekal malware database5 
Splash screens were analysed for content based on the elements introduced 
in sections 2.1 and 3. Where a particular feature was detected, this was 
recorded, feeding into the quantitative data for the present study. A further 
                                                        
1 ID Ransomware - https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com/  
2 Bleeping Computer forum - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/  
3 The Windows Club - http://www.thewindowsclub.com/ 
4 VirusTotal – http://www.virustotal.com 
5 Malekal website - http://malwaredb.malekal.com/ 
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qualitative exploration of aspects of the language used was also incorporated, 
and this focused on the use of mechanisms that could be used to persuade the 
victim to pay the ransom.  
4. Results 
In the context of the overview of the ransomware splash screens, several key 




In general, Bitcoin (BTC) was the attackers preferred mechanism for payment, 
with 75% of ransomware splash screens asking for payment in BTC. In an 
associated element, 39% of the ransomware splash screens actively provided 
clear instructions on how the victim could buy Bitcoins. A smaller proportion of 
the ransomware splash screens advised the victim to download the Tor web 
browser to buy Bitcoins from other sources. In some individual cases the victims 
were asked to pay in other forms, such as MoneyPak or Western Union, but 
these represented just two of the sample in the current study.  
 
Just over half of the total sample contained the requested ransom amount 
(55%) in the initial splash screen. The payments requested for the ransom 
ranged from a minimum 0.001 BTC ($30 USD) to a maximum of 13 BTC 
($4,980 USD) in one example. Controlling for this one extreme amount, the 
average amount requested by attackers was 0.47 BTC ($1,164 USD). In 
several cases the ransom amount was seen to increase exponentially as time 
between the onset of the attack and payment elapsed. In general, attackers 
doubled the ransom amount after a certain time period, increasing the aspects 
of time criticality.  
4.2 Time Criticality 
The feature of time criticality (e.g. noting a deadline for payment that the victim 
must adhere to before consequences to their data occur) appeared in over half 
of the sample (57%) and is one of the key features used in social engineering 
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attacks to persuade a victim to act quickly. In the context of the social 
engineering framework presented by Hadnagy (2010) this aspect of time 
criticality links into the notion of scarcity, which in turn creates a sense of 
urgency. For instance, an attacker might indicate that if payment is not made 
by a certain time, their files could be deleted, the requested ransom might 
increase or their files will be published on the Internet. This obviously pushes 
the need to make a decision quickly. It is also noted that the messages 
accompanying the ransomware splash screen often include a warning that the 
attackers are the only individuals who can provide the necessary private unlock 
key, hence increasing the notion of scarcity even more. 
 
In terms of the specific time allowed to pay the ransom, there was a large range 
in the sample, and the consequences for not paying within the set time were 
also varied. The shortest time-period detailed in the sample for the payment of 
the ransom was just 10 hours in one example and, given the length of time it 
can take a victim to obtain Bitcoins, this could present a challenge. However, 
this short time-period was an isolated case; the majority of attackers requested 
payment within a 72-hour time period (36%), with 16% requesting payment in 
48 hours and 16% in 96 hours. Just under a quarter (23%) of splash screens 
that included an aspect of time criticality for the payment of the ransom gave 
victims longer than 96 hours to pay the ransom. Just a small proportion (6%) 
requested payment in less than 12 hours.  
 
In terms of the consequences for not paying, or missing the deadline for 
payment, a variety of elements came up in the sample. The most likely one was 
that the files would be deleted and the victim would not be able to gain access 
to them again, perhaps the consequence most typically associated with a 
ransomware attack. However, other aspects emerged in the sample, with 
several of the splash screens making the overt threat to publish the contents of 
the locked files on the Internet. This could be particularly damaging to 
companies where sensitive information is being held, hence providing the 
attackers with another form of leverage. This aspect could be loosely mapped 
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into the social engineering mechanism of scarcity and, in particular, the sub-
aspect of urgency – only a quick reaction will prevent sensitive files from being 
released onto the web. Other attackers levied aspects of urgency by 
threatening to increase the ransom if the initial sum was not paid in the time 
allocated, or threatening to delete a file each hour after the payment deadline.  
 
4.3 Visual Presentation 
In the context of the visual elements attached to the ransomware splash 
screens, there was a great deal of variation in terms of both the complexity and 
presentation. The majority of the splash screens were very heavily text-based 
in terms of content, and a few implemented the use of icons and images taken 
from popular media and films. A number of the splash screens (15%) were very 
basic text files or notepad files and contained very limited information about the 
attack (see image 1). The instructions usually referred the victim to other 
documents that had been installed on the computer as part of the attack, or 
asked them to visit a webpage (usually Tor-based) to get further information.  
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A set of more advanced ransomware splash screens emerged from the sample, 
these being typified by the inclusion of detailed information related to the attack, 
payment details and contact details. They were also logically structured and 
presented information clearly to the victim, usually in a sequential order. This 
could be linked back to aspects of social engineering, in particular that of 
authority. An informative splash screen gives the victim an impression of a 
group that is well organised and knows what they are doing. In turn, this 
generates a level of confidence in the victim that payment of the ransom will 
eventually lead to them getting their files back. More research in this area needs 
to explore this in a more direct manner, and again this suggestion is speculation 
based on the existing research in the area. The splash screens conforming to 
this latter configuration generally followed a set pattern (see image 2) and 
included a detailed description of the attack, how the individual could obtain 
Bitcoins for payment, how to pay, as well as a backup option for payment if the 
initial option was unavailable. This three-tiered approach to communicating 
ransomware to the victim was frequently replicated throughout the sample.  
 
For the attacker, there is a potential benefit for using such an approach. For 
example, it increases the potential for payment as it allows the victim to fully 
understand what has been done and how they can get their files back. The way 
the ransom screen is organized provides the victim with all the relevant 
information they need in a self-contained box which means the victim does not 
have to move between windows or websites, hence reducing aspects of 
cognitive load (Sweller, 1988). This, in turn, reduces confusion for the victim 
and increases the likelihood of payment. However, this element is purely 
conjectural and the limited data for the current sample prevents any clear 
conclusions in this regard. 
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Image 2: An example of the more complex splash screen; note the use of the lock 
icon and countdown timer. 
 
 
4.3.1. Use of Symbols and Culturally Iconic Images 
One interesting element that came through in the exploration of the splash 
screens was the use of a variety of images. One sub-category of these included 
very simple icons, such as the use of lock icons, shields and badges. In several 
instances, the ransomware splash screen included logos taken from prominent 
law enforcement agencies, including the crest of the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) (see image 7 further in the report). Such use of these 
specific images again links into the social engineering aspect of authority, 
particularly when the same image was used in a ransomware splash screen 
purporting to have detected pornography and/or copyrighted material on the 
victim’s computer. This was also noted in splash screens where trademark 
logos from Windows and Microsoft were used to enhance the appearance of 
the attack. Both mechanisms were used in ‘cuckoo’ ransomware attacks that 
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One of the most prominent pop cultural images used was that of “Jigsaw”, a 
character that appears in the Saw horror movie series (see image 4 below). 
The character acts as a spokesperson for an often-unseen attacker, and has a 
menacing appearance. The use of such imagery is interesting as it almost gives 
a substance to what is generally seen as a faceless crime, although it is noted 
that just a few of the splash screens used this image. Another image that was 
often used in the samples was the Guy Fawkes mask, used most notably with 
the hacking group Anonymous (see image 5 below). Again, this symbol is used 
to enhance the authority element associated with social engineering, with many 
individuals (irrespective of their technical background) having some familiarity 
with Anonymous and their associated exploits. The use of these pop cultural 
icons is an interesting element of the ransomware splash screen and, as yet, is 
something that has not been fully explored in the context of research. It would 
be useful to understand how the victims of such attacks perceive such cultural 
symbols and how they feed into the decision-making process aligned with 
paying the ransom. 
Image 4: The use of the Jigsaw character from the Saw film series – this symbol was 
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Image 5: The use of the Guy Fawkes mask appeared in several of the splash screens. 
This one is also conspicuous because it claims to be copyrighted by Wikileaks founder 
Julian Assange.   
 
4.3.2 The ‘Cuckoo’ Ransomware 
This term has been coined in the current report to describe ransomware that 
doesn’t overtly ask for a ‘ransom’, or that appears to be from an official source. 
In the present sample, this type of ransomware accounted for just 9% of the 
total number of splash screens and, often, there were slight variations along a 
similar theme (see images 6 and 7 below). As can be seen, this type of 
ransomware attack uses several social engineering tactics already mentioned 
previously in this report. Primarily there is the use of official trademarks or 
emblems, which instils the notion of authority and credibility to the request. The 
language is also interesting as there is often a lot of technical information 
related to the relevant legal statute that has been allegedly transgressed by the 
victim. The examples which included the FBI emblems were even more 
interesting when looking at the payment options offered as they asked for 
Bitcoins, which would perhaps flag this as a potential scam straightaway for 
those who had more knowledge about this type of currency. Secondly, a 
variation of ransomware also offers individuals the opportunity to go into a local 
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courthouse to pay their fine, but with the provision that this would mean it would 
take longer (4-5 working days) to unlock their files. This is an interesting tactic, 
as, for most individuals, urgency to unlock their computer and access the files 
on it would make the second option redundant. (Note: There is no further data 
to assess if victims actually chose to visit a courthouse to pay their fine, and is 
noted as another aspect for further research in that area.)  
 
Other examples of this type of attack included warnings that the operating 
system (usually Windows) had been blocked or banned due to the detection of 
illegal or copyrighted software and/or the detection of other spurious activities 
(such as visiting websites with adult content and pornographic images). Again, 
there is a clear lack of actionable intelligence about how successful these types 
of attacks are. It is assumed that they may be directed to those who are more 
vulnerable (e.g. the elderly), those who wish not to have such information 
released to family/friends, and those who have limited technical knowledge 
and, therefore, would be more likely to just pay the ransom right away. 
Image 6: A clear example of the “Cuckoo” form of ransomware, notable in its use of 
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Image 7: Another example of “Cuckoo” ransomware displaying aspects of authority 
in the form of key law enforcement agencies. 
 
4.4 The Unusual and The Bizarre 
Some of the splash screens from the sample stood out for other reasons, mainly 
because they contained either very random images or differed so much from 
the rest of the sample they deserved a more in-depth discussion. The first one 
that was highlighted is shown in image 8 below.  
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Image 8: The example of a unique splash screen that is conversational and overtly 
trying to establish liking, perhaps as an attempt to garner payment of the ransom. 
 
 
There are a variety of aspects to this splash screen that are interesting. The 
text attempts to be humorous and conversational, perhaps an attempt to elicit 
an aspect of liking, another tactic used in social engineering. The two further 
interesting elements are contained under the header of “How to Purchase?” 
where the attacker asks the victim to send Bitcoins “or buy me some cup of 
coffee or we could hang out together that is fine! 😊”, as well as “check the 
F.A.Q. or hang out with me!”. The final aspect of this is the option to send 
Bitcoins and is labelled “send with love”. This splash screen is filled with 
paradoxes, as the attacker obviously wants the victim to pay the relevant 
ransom, but then also appears to want the victim to like them, attempting to 
engage them in conversational and interpersonal interactions. The offer to allow 
the victim to “donate” to the ransomware project is another element to this 
splash screen that makes it unusual. One final notable element is the offer of a 
discount for individuals who are “poor”, which makes this attacker perhaps the 
only one to exhibit an aspect of “social conscience”; however it is also noted 
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that if they had such an aspect to their personality they would not have initiated 
the attack in the first instance.  
4.5 The ‘Customer Service’ Angle 
It seems strange to suggest that ransomware attacks have an aspect of 
customer service attached to them but, within the sample selected for the 
present study, this element became more apparent. Again, this perhaps fits into 
the notion of authority, and the overt notion that a well-organised and structured 
organisation may make victims more likely to pay the ransom by treating them 
like “customers.” In this sample, 51% of the splash screens included some 
aspect of customer service, ranging from instructions on how to buy BTC, 
downloading Tor or key Frequently Asked Questions. In one example splash 
screen (see Image 9) the victim was offered the chance to ‘speak to a member 
of the team’; this fulfils two key aims: 
1. Elicits the connotation of the group being organised and; 
2. An overt invitation for the victim to contact the group if they have any 
issues, and may fit into the pattern of liking. 
  
Image 9: An overt display of apparent customer service, with reference to the 
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Many of the splash screens also provided clear instructions on how victims 
could obtain Bitcoins as well as included links to local sites where they could 
be purchased. One example even included a short video tutorial showing how 
to buy BTCs, demonstrating the importance of making sure the ‘customer’ is 
well informed. As discussed in brief earlier in this report, this aspect provides 
the victim with essential information, particularly where they have no knowledge 
of such payment methods or how to buy them. It also provides another 
mechanism for the attacker to get the ransom; simply stating that the payment 
needs to be given in BTCs has the potential to create confusion and further 
panic in the victim, leading to a delay in payment. Presenting this information 
in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) is also an interesting 
approach and further emulates well know practices from business. 
 
Incidentally, a wider number of the splash screens contained detailed 
information about the type of algorithm that had been used to encrypt the data; 
in several instances the splash screens referred the victim to detailed 
information (usually in the form of a link to Wikipedia) on this topic as well. Such 
algorithms were often described as ‘military grade’. This could be a tactic that 
would suggest any attempt to circumvent the encryption process would be a 
fruitless endeavour. Nearly 44% of the ransomware splash screens also 
contained an overt warning not to tamper with encryption or try to find other 
help to aid in the decoding. All these are further examples of the customer 
service angle presented by the ransomware splash screens – from one 
perspective the attackers are promoting the legitimacy of their product, with 
supporting evidence from an external source. On the other hand, they are 
protecting their brand by telling the victim not to attempt to tamper with the 
ransomware as only they can provide the right public key.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This report presents a first attempt at exploring the underlying psychology that 
is hidden within ransomware splash screens. In the context of the present study 
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there are a variety of key findings that demonstrated ransomware splash 
screens are not as basic as perhaps first assumed. Similarly, like ransomware 
attacks, the splash screens that accompany them are not all the same, and hint 
towards differing levels of sophistication. Attackers, whether it is by design or 
through imitation, are employing a variety of tactics that appear to be geared 
towards eliciting payment from victims. The argument presented in the current 
report suggests that these tactics are closely aligned to the concept of social 
engineering, working on aspects of fear, urgency, scarcity, authority and, in 
some cases, humour. Other elements emerge from the analysis, including the 
presentation of a customer service element to ransomware that is perhaps 
something of an unusual aspect. The presence of ransomware that is cleverly 
disguised as a formal transgression of laws or linked to the use of copyrighted 
programs/material is also another interesting trend within the current sample.  
 
The key points present in this initial exploration of ransomware splash screens 
highlights the following: 
● Not all splash screens are the same – there is a distinct difference in 
terms of the level of sophistication of mechanisms used to gain payment, 
presentation of the splash screens and provision of information for 
further contact. However, there is no further data to explore how such 
differences map to their success in terms of eliciting payment. 
● The ransomware splash screens utilise key aspects of influence and 
persuasion, concepts that are often used in the context of social 
engineering, to present a convincing argument for the victim to pay their 
ransom. 
● A small subset of ransomware splash screens served to intimidate the 
victim by claiming to be from an official source or law enforcement 
agency but that did not explicitly ask for a specific ransom be paid. These 
were termed ‘cuckoo’ ransomware, and utilised official branding and 
badges to enhance the authority element. 
● A variety of images and cultural icons were used in the ransomware 
splash screens. The cultural icons presented overtly menacing images, 
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again hypothesised to create a fear response in victims. Shield and lock 
icons were also evident, and it is noted that such icons are also widely 
used by cybersecurity companies and anti-virus programs. It is unclear 
if this is an attempt by attackers to emulate the professional appearance 
of such, or is simply an ad hoc addition. 
 
There are some obvious limitations to the current study, not only in terms of the 
inferences made between the content and the potential mechanisms being 
used by the attackers. More research is needed in this area, aligned to a more 
systematic approach to the collection and classification of ransomware splash 
screens. In this instance there has been a close focus on a very small 
proportion of the potential psychological theories that could be applied in this 
context, and there is a wide variety of further work that needs to be done in this 
area. By expanding the current work with more empirical research, a clearer 
understanding of why certain ransomware splash screens are more successful 
at eliciting a payment over others could be obtained. Such information could in 
turn be used to provide effective mitigation techniques for such attacks, as well 
as giving both investigators and victims a clearer pathway for help and advice 
in the event of an attack. 
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